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The European Convention in Conflicted Societies:  
The Experience of Northern Ireland and Turkey 
 
Dr Onder Bakircioglu and Prof Brice Dickson1 
 
Introduction 
During the 63-year life of the European Convention to date, Europe has witnessed 
an array of conflicts. This article reviews the role played by the Convention in two of them 
– the conflict in Northern Ireland between those who want it to remain part of the United 
Kingdom and those who want it to become part of a re-unified Ireland, and the conflict in 
Turkey between State authorities and the armed supporters of an independent or 
autonomous Kurdish region where Kurds could enjoy greater political and cultural rights. 
The main aim is to assess the principles and procedures which the Convention organs in 
Strasbourg have developed in response to applications lodged by victims of human rights 
abuses alleged to have been committed during these two conflicts. The assessment wil l 
reveal whether Strasbourg has succeeded in adopting an approach which can contribute to 
a reduction in human rights abuses and to a speedier solution of conflicts. The findings may 
be relevant when the European Court of Human Rights and the Committee of Ministers are 
confronted by other serious conflicts, such as in the Balkans or the Caucasus. 
It was in 1969 that serious civil unrest broke out in Northern Ireland. Seeds of serious 
Kurdish unrest were sown in Turkey in 1978 and a large uprising occurred in 1984. In each 
of the two States the conflict revolved around claims to territory and the rights of ethno-
political minorities. In Northern Ireland a substantial minority of the population (up to 40% 
at times, mainly Catholics) wanted the area to be part of Ireland rather than part of the 
United Kingdom, while in Turkey a substantial minority (up to 20%) claimed that their 
Kurdish identity was not being appropriately recognized under Turkish law. In response to 
the unrest both the UK and Turkish governments adopted special security measures, 
including some new laws, and it was mainly these which resulted in numerous applications 
being lodged in Strasbourg. The challenge facing the Commission and Court was to ensure 
that victims of human rights abuses had access to justice but also that governments should 
                                                          
1 Respectively, Senior Lecturer in Law at the University of Leicester (ob51@leicester.ac.uk) and Professor of 
Law at Queen’s University Belfast (b.dickson@qub.ac.uk). The authors acknowledge the benefit of discussions 
during early thinking about this article with Dr Darren Dinsmore, Lecturer in Law at the University of Kent, but 
the views expressed in this version are entirely their own. 
2 
 
have some margin of appreciation to take measures which they deemed proportionate to 
deal with the unrest. No doubt the Commission and Court wanted the conflicts to be 
resolved, but their primary goal was to see that in particular cases a fair decision was 
reached as to whether human rights had been abused or not. Although the conflicts did 
occasionally spill over into neighbouring States, they were essentially internal security 
threats and not conflicts between nations. They each involved violent insurgencies, led in 
Northern Ireland by the Irish Republican Army (the IRA), although other paramilitary 
organizations were active as well, and in Turkey by the Kurdistan Workers Party (the PKK). 
Some assistance was provided to the insurgents by external sources – money from the USA 
and arms from Libya in the case of the IRA, money, logistical support and weapons from 
Syria, Iran and Northern Iraq in the case of the PKK. Between 1969 and 1998 (when the 
Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement was reached) more than 3,600 people were killed in 
Northern Ireland. Since 1984, when the insurgency grew in intensity, more than 45,000 
people have been killed in Turkey.   
Having each joined the Council of Europe in 1949, the United Kingdom and Turkey 
were amongst the first countries to ratify the European Convention on Human Rights. The 
United Kingdom became bound by it in 1953 and Turkey in 1954. The United Kingdom 
accepted the jurisdiction of the European Court in inter-State cases as soon as it was 
established in 1959, and granted individuals the right to petition the European Commission 
of Human Rights in 1966. Turkey granted the right of individual petition to the European 
Commission in 1987 but did not accept the jurisdiction of the European Court until 1990. 
Prior to 1987 only inter-state cases brought against Turkey could be considered in 
Strasbourg, and then only by the Commission. The conflict in Northern Ireland was at the 
heart of the first ever decision reached by the European Court in 19602 and was also the 
focal point of the first inter-State case to result in a judgment from the European Court in 
1978.3 Turkey faced an inter-State complaint from France, Norway, Denmark, Sweden and 
the Netherlands concerning alleged human rights abuses committed by the military 
government in the early 1980s, but this was settled before reaching the Court,4 as was 
another inter-State case taken by Denmark against Turkey relating to the alleged ill -
treatment of a Danish national while detained in Turkey.5 When Turkey was eventually 
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3 Ireland v UK (1979-80) 2 EHRR 25. 
4 (1983) 35 DR 143. 
5 (2000) 29 EHRR CD35. 
3 
 
brought before the European Court by another State, it was in relation to its actions in 
Cyprus.6  
As will be explained below, applications relating to the conflicts in Northern Ireland 
and Turkey have led the Court to elaborate new substantive doctrines, especially in relation 
to the right to life and the right not to be ill-treated, as well as new procedural approaches, 
especially in relation to exhaustion of domestic remedies and fact-finding. Much, though, 
still remains to be done to make the European Convention a more effective instrument in 
conflict resolution. The fact that the Convention is notoriously weak on the protection of 
minorities is a significant encumbrance in this regard.7 Another salient feature of the 
Court’s approach has been its reluctance to find a government responsible for systematic 
abuses of human rights during counter-insurgency activities. Its focus on individual cases 
appears to make the Court loathe to issue more general pronouncements about a State’s 
overall response to civil unrest.  
This article proceeds by summarising the main features of Strasbourg’s engagement 
with the conflict in Northern Ireland before turning to how it has engaged with the conflict 
in Turkey. The latter section cross-refers to the former where appropriate and the article 
concludes with some brief general conclusions regarding the ability of the ECHR to play a 
significant role during times of serious non-international conflicts.     
 
The Conflict in Northern Ireland 
The number of applications lodged with the European Commission and Court of 
Human Rights arising out of the conflict in Northern Ireland is much less than that arising 
out of the conflict in Turkey.8 In general terms, the Strasbourg organs have moved over time 
from a relatively ‘hands-off’ approach to a much more interventionist one. This is partly 
attributable to better presentation of applications by applicants’ lawyers but also to a 
growing maturity within the European Court itself as it has gradually developed a method 
for ensuring that human rights are not easily sacrificed on the altar of political expediency 
within Member States. As will be seen, Strasbourg’s more ‘hands-on’ approach to cases 
stemming from the conflict in Turkey is partly a consequence of the relative severity of 
the human rights violations committed by the security forces there: while security forces 
                                                          
6 Cyprus v Turkey (2002) 35 EHRR 30.   
7 Though see the more upbeat account given by Geoff Gilbert, ‘The burgeoning minority rights 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2002) 24 HRQ 736. 
8 For a comprehensive survey see Brice Dickson, The European Convention on Human Rights and the Conflict 
in Northern Ireland (Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2010). 
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often behaved badly in Northern Ireland, the outrages were by no means as frequent nor 
as premeditated as in Turkey. They were also subjected to much greater scrutiny by 
domestic courts and independent reviewers. Moreover the abuses in Northern Ireland were 
committed at a time when international law placed less emphasis on the rights of 
individuals and more on the interests of States.9 
 
Initial applications under the Convention 
Initial applications to Strasbourg focused on claims of religious discrimination in 
the way public housing was being allocated by local councils in Northern Ireland, with 
some Protestant-controlled councils tending to favour Protestant applicants. They also 
raised complaints about the ‘gerrymandering’ of electoral areas, whereby constituencies 
with a majority of Catholic voters elected fewer representatives than comparably-sized 
constituencies with a majority of Protestant voters. In addition, complaints were made 
about the draconian nature of some of the Regulations issued under the Civil Authorities 
(Special Powers) Acts (NI) 1922-44. Because the United Kingdom did not recognize the 
right of individual petition until 1966, the only hope of getting Strasbourg's attention on 
these issues before then was by bringing an inter-State case, but the Irish government 
refused to initiate such a case, despite being lobbied to do so by several prominent 
nationalists in Ireland, North and South.  
Six applications were eventually lodged by individuals in 1968, and a further seven 
in 1969. But all of these came to nothing, mainly because the lawyers helping with the cases 
did not fully co-operate with the bodies in Strasbourg, and the European Commission 
eventually struck the cases out of the list.10 An application lodged by a member of the UK 
Parliament, Bernadette Devlin, was declared inadmissible too.11 At her trial for inciting 
people to commit riotous behavior she had wanted to call witness evidence to show that she 
was only trying to prevent illegal actions by the police, but the Commission sheltered 
behind the nostrum that national authorities have a wide discretion as to what evidence is 
or is not admissible at a trial. A further set of applications was lodged in Strasbourg in 
                                                          
9 This point is confirmed by the Appeals Chamber of the International Court for the Former Yugoslavia in 
Tadic, where it was held that such traditional distinctions as those between international and non-international 
armed conflicts gradually lose weight in terms of basic human rights violations, largely because international 
law is no longer exclusively concerned with safeguarding State interests. In the court’s language, ‘a State-
sovereignty-oriented approach has been gradually supplanted by a human-being-oriented approach.’ Prosecutor 
v Dusko Tadic, No: IT-94-1, ICTY, 2 October 1995, paras. 96-97.    
10 (1970) Ybk 340, 434. A chronology of the proceedings and exchange of correspondence is set out at 
358-386. 
11 37 CD 146 (3 February 1971); (1971) Ybk 634. 
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1971 and 1972, raising, amongst other points, the retrospective legitimation by the 
Northern Ireland Act 1972 of illegal actions by British soldiers (allegedly in breach of 
ECHR Article 7) and the interference by British authorities in the correspondence between 
complainants and their lawyer.12 The former were dismissed on the basis that the applicants 
were non-victims (which also put an end to complaints about the Special Powers Acts and 
the overall conduct of the security forces in Northern Ireland); the latter failed for lack of 
evidence.  
Early applications to Strasbourg from Northern Ireland seem to have foundered 
because they were not carefully enough formulated and managed. Given the youthfulness 
of the institutions applied to, there was, understandably, a degree of uncertainty as to what 
would or would not pass muster in Strasbourg, but, looking back, one might still have 
hoped that convincing claims by deserving applicants could have been made out. Boyle, 
Hadden and Hillyard, writing in 1974, go some way towards explaining why the domestic 
legal system of Northern Ireland was failing the people who lived there,13 but they might 
also have stressed the lack of knowledge about the European Convention at that time. 
Subsequent applications were more successful, but by no means in every respect. 
We will consider them under the headings of the right to liberty, the right not to be i ll-
treated, the right to life and the right to a fair trial. 
 
The right to liberty 
In 1971 the use of internment without trial was authorised in Northern Ireland. 
Hundreds of men who were sympathetic to the cause of Irish republicanism were detained 
without trial, some for what turned out to be more than three years. The system did not 
end until 1975.14 The same practice had been employed in the Republic of Ireland during 
an earlier bout of troubles (1956-62) and in the European Court's first ever decision, 
Lawless v Ireland,15 the Court upheld the validity of the practice because Ireland had 
lawfully derogated from its obligations under Article 5 due to the ‘public emergency 
threatening the life of the nation.’ For the first time the Court held that during grave public 
                                                          
12 MM v UK and X, Y and Z v UK App Nos 5155/71, 5727/72, 5744/72, 5857/72, 6 DR 13 (1976) and 14 DR 5 
(1978). X v UK App No 5459/72, 40 CD 7 (1972) dealt with the alleged interference with correspondence. 
13 Kevin Boyle, Tom Hadden and Paddy Hillyard, Law and State: The Case of Northern Ireland (London: 
Martin Robertson; 1974) ch 2. 
14 For details see G Hogan and C Walker, Political Violence and the Law in Ireland (1989) 86-100. 
15 (1979-80) 1 EHRR 1. See, generally, Brian Doolan, Lawless v Ireland (1957-1961): The First Case 
Before the European Court of Human Rights (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing; 2001). 
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emergencies ‘Contracting States would have a certain margin of appreciation’.16 This 
doctrine has occupied a crucial position within the Strasbourg jurisprudence ever since and 
was a crucial barrier to more effective scrutiny by the Court of measures taken in both 
Northern Ireland and Turkey to counter the insurgencies in those jurisdictions.17  
Ironically, it was the introduction of internment in Northern Ireland that finally 
persuaded the Irish government18 to raise an inter-State challenge against the United 
Kingdom in Strasbourg in 1971.19 In 1972 the European Commission declared the bulk of 
the allegations admissible,20 but in 1976, more than four years after the application was 
lodged, the Commission unanimously decided that the measures for detention without trial, 
in derogation from Article 5 of the Convention were, indeed ‘strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation’ under Article 15(1).21 Although the internment tactic targeted 
only Republicans (and not ‘Loyalists’) the Commission also rejected the argument that the 
way in which internment had been operated violated Article 14 of the Convention, read in 
conjunction with Article 5. The decision confirmed the broad measure of discretion States 
enjoyed in derogation cases. This case also provided the opportunity for Strasbourg organs 
to clarify the rationale for the margin of appreciation doctrine. It was stressed that ‘by 
reason of their direct and continuous contact with the pressing needs of the moment,’ 
national authorities are better placed to decide whether to derogate from a right in public 
emergency situations,22 even when the disputed security measures clearly discriminated 
between competing unlawful paramilitary groups. Ireland v UK signaled the wide extent 
to which State-centered arguments were preferred in public emergency cases as a 
consequence of the Strasbourg organs significantly self-limiting their powers of review.  
The inter-State case was referred to the European Court of Human Rights in 1976, 
but almost two more years were to elapse before it issued its judgment.23 During those two 
years there were 409 conflict-related deaths in Northern Ireland, 2,989 bombs were 
                                                          
16 Lawless v Ireland, App No 332/57, 2 Ybk 318 (1960), paras 28-30.  
17 See, Oren Gross and Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, ‘From discretion to scrutiny: revisiting the application of the 
margin of appreciation doctrine in the context of Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights’ 
(2002) 23 HRQ 625; Onder Bakircioglu, ‘The application of the margin of appreciation doctrine in 
freedom of expression and public morality cases,’ (2007) 8 German LJ 711. 
18 The details of this decision-making process are described by William Schabas and Aisling O'Sullivan in 
‘Of politics and poor weather: how Ireland decided to sue the United Kingdom under the European 
Convention on Human Rights’ in (2007) 2 Irish Ybk of Int’ L 3. 
19 App No 5310171 (1971) 14 Ybk 100. 
20 (1972) 15 Ybk 76. 
21 (1976) 19 Ybk 512; publications of the European Court of Human Rights, Series B: Pleadings, Oral 
Arguments and Documents, Vol 23-1(1980). 
22 Ireland v UK, App No 5310/71 (18 January, 1978), para 207.  
23 (1979-80) 2 EHRR 25.   
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planted, 1,427 weapons and 19.6 tons of explosives were found, and 2,584 persons were 
charged with terrorist offences. In 1978 the European Court confirmed the view of the 
Commission that the use of internment in Northern Ireland was not a violation of the 
Convention, just as it had held more than 16 years earlier that internment in the Republic 
of Ireland during the 1950s was also permissible. The Court said that the United Kingdom 
had validly derogated from the application of Articles 5 and 6, simply asserting that the 
existence of the public emergency was ‘perfectly clear from the facts’.24 
Viewed retrospectively, it is rather remarkable that at a time when a wide variety of 
politicians and academics in Britain and Ireland were commenting on the counter-
productiveness of internment in Northern Ireland, and when other European countries 
facing serious terrorist attacks (such as West Germany and Italy) were not finding it 
necessary to resort to internment, the European Court should – with so little detailed analysis 
– condone the practice. The last internee had been released even before the European 
Commission adopted its report into the Irish government’s application, so it was not as if a 
finding by the European Court against the United Kingdom’s use of internment would have 
driven a coach and horses through current national policy and practice in relation to the 
control of terrorism in Northern Ireland. As we will see, the Court did hold that the United 
Kingdom had breached Article 3, which makes it all the more difficult to understand why 
there was no adverse finding in relation to Article 5 too. It is also disappointing that the 
European Court did not deal in any detail with the serious allegations made against the UK 
government to the effect that it had failed to properly cooperate with the European 
Commission and Court in their consideration of the Irish government’s allegations.  
When indefinite internment ended in 1975 the UK government relied instead on 
‘executive detention’, whereby an arrested suspect could be held by the police for up to 48 
hours and then detained purely on the order of a government minister for a further five 
days before having to be either charged and brought before a judge for a decision on the 
lawfulness of the detention or released without charge.25 The application in Brogan v UK26 
was the prompt for the European Court to issue a ruling that, in general, no-one can be 
held in detention without being brought before a judicial authority for more than 96 hours . 
In practice, however, this decision made little difference because the United Kingdom 
                                                          
24 (1979-80) 2 EHRR 25, 91, para 25. 
25 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974, s 7(2), later replaced  by a comparable provision 
in 1976, 1984 and 1989; it was not repealed until the Terrorism Act 2000 came into force in February 2001. 
26 (1989) 11 EHRR 117. See too O'Hara v UK (2002) 34 EHRR 812. 
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reacted by re-introducing the derogation from Article 5 which it had inexplicably 
withdrawn four years earlier, in 1984. When the new derogation was later challenged, the 
Court had little hesitation in upholding its validity.27 It was even upheld in a case relating 
to an arrest in 1998, four years after the IRA’s first ceasefire in 1994 (which was broken 
in 1996 but renewed in 1997).28 It is clear that after 1975 in Northern Ireland short-term 
internment in effect replaced indefinite internment. 
The European Court did insist that arrest powers in Northern Ireland should be 
founded on reasonable suspicion, not just suspicion,29 but the domestic law had already 
been changed by the time that judgment was issued and one can question whether the 
change made any real difference in practice. Certainly Strasbourg has not been very strong 
as regards the right of arrested people to be told the grounds of their arrest: in Brogan v 
UK30 the Court held that reasonable suspicion of involvement in ‘terrorism’ was enough 
(without mention having to be made of any specific offences) and in Kerr v UK31 it held 
that the applicant detainee should have been able to work out for himself, from the 
questions put to him over the course of 39 interviews within a week, why he had been 
arrested. The record on delays in trials and on the availability of bail is better: in the early 
case of Orchin v UK32 the Commission found a breach of Article 6 where the applicant had 
been remanded on bail for no less than four years before being tried in relation to the 
possession of firearms, and in Gault v UK33 (a non-troubles related case) the Court found 
a breach of Article 5 where a woman had been refused bail pending her re-trial for aiding 
and abetting the murder of her husband. In McKay v UK,34 however, the Grand Chamber 
held that there was no breach of Article 5(3) when an alleged armed robber was brought 
before a magistrate who was empowered to consider the lawfulness of his arrest but not 
whether he should be granted bail. 
The Convention proved of little use in controlling the operation of powers to detain 
people for long periods at ports and airports,35 or to exclude them from discrete parts of 
the United Kingdom. 
                                                          
27 Brannigan and McBride (1993) 17 EHRR 539. 
28 Marshall v UK App No 41571/98, decision of 19 July 2001. 
29 Fox, Campbell and Hartley v UK (1991) 13 EHRR 157. Contrast Murray (Margaret) v UK (1994) I9 
EHRR 193. 
30 See, n 26 above. 
31 (2000) 29 EHRR CD 184. 
32 (1984) 6 EHRR 391. 
33 (2008) 46 EHRR 48. 
34 (2007) 44 EHRR 41. 
35 McVeigh, O'Neill and Evans v UK (1983) 5 EHRR 71. 
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The right not to be ill-treated  
The first case to raise issues concerning the alleged mistreatment of detainees in 
Northern Ireland was Donnelly v UK.36 There were seven applicants involved, this time 
carefully selected on the basis of their actual victimhood. Each of the men alleged that he 
had been beaten while in police custody – some said that they had received blows to the 
head and body, others that they had been kicked in the genitals or given electric shocks to 
their genitals. Three of the applicants even alleged that against their will they had been 
administered ‘truth drugs’ to make them confess to crimes. In all they referred to 157 
specific cases of alleged ill-treatment.37 The applicants asked for a temporary injunction to 
put a halt to such practices pending the outcome of their applications. They also asked for 
their applications to be given expedited consideration and for a full investigation to be 
conducted into the alleged systemic brutality. With commendable speed, the European 
Commission announced just seven weeks after the applications had been lodged that it 
would indeed expedite their consideration but that it had no power to issue a temporary 
injunction.38 
In 1973, the Commission declared the applications to be admissible,39 which in itself 
was a significant triumph for the applicants, not only because the Commission was prepared 
to proceed with the case even though similar allegations were still pending before the 
European Commission in the inter-State application lodged by Ireland in 1971,40 but also 
because it established two propositions which have since become firm rules within the 
European Convention system. The first is that an individual can complain that an 
administrative practice is a systematic breach of the Convention provided that he or she 
adduces prima facie evidence of such a practice and of the applicant being a victim of it.41 
The second is that when an individual alleges the existence of such an administrative 
practice he or she does not first have to exhaust domestic remedies in that regard: instead, 
the question of the effectiveness of those domestic remedies can be considered at the same 
time as, and as part of, the merits of the application.42 These were remarkably progressive 
                                                          
36 (1973) Ybk 212, 43 CD 122 (admissibility); (1975) 4 DR 4 (merits). 
37 (1973) Ybk 212, 216. 
38 (1973) Ybk 212; 43 CD 122. 
39 Ibid. 
40 The Commission decided to allow the overlapping allegations to be considered because under Art 
27(1)(b) of the Convention an application is to be excluded from consideration if it is substantially the 
same as a matter which has `already been examined', and the inter-State case had not yet been examined. 
41 43 CD 122, 146. 
42 The Commission quoted what it had said in the First Greek Case, App No 3321-3/67; (1969) 12bis 
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conclusions for the time and marked a somewhat unheralded coming-of-age for the 
European Commission in its handling of applications under the Convention. This article 
will show below that allegations of an administrative practice and exceptions to the rule of 
prior exhaustion of domestic remedies also came to characterize a sizeable portion of 
security-related applications lodged from Turkey. 
Unfortunately, the initial triumph at the admissibility stage in Donnelly v UK turned 
out to be a Pyrrhic victory. After the Commission had examined the merits of the claim, it 
decided that the alleged administrative practice could not be considered to be in violation 
of the Convention because evidence had not been adduced to show that it rendered domestic 
remedies ineffective or inadequate.43 Three of the seven applicants were held not to have 
exhausted the local remedies available to them within the legal system of Northern Ireland. 
The other four had already received financial settlements in respect of their claims. The 
Commission was therefore of the view that it had been shown that the machinery for 
providing compensation had worked effectively in practice. It considered at some length 
the applicants’ wider argument that, in the circumstances prevailing in Northern Ireland, 
compensation was not an adequate remedy for their complaints, since they were allegedly 
the victims of an administrative practice,44 but it concluded that the procedures in place to 
prevent the occurrence or repetition of the acts complained of were effective enough for 
the purposes of the Convention. 
All in all, the Donnelly case presented a further lesson to applicants and lawyers 
alike. Providing that a State is systematically failing to comply with its Convention 
obligations is extremely difficult, especially at a time when a conflict is raging and the 
collection of hard evidence is highly problematic.  The reluctance of the Strasbourg organs 
to implicate the government in systematic violations of human rights persisted in 
insurgency-related Turkish cases as well. Suggestions that a State is failing in its 
obligations can be easily defeated by the State showing that it is making its best effort to 
prevent abuses of rights. In the 1970s and 1980s, moreover, it was almost always  fatal to 
an applicant’s case that he or she had started civil legal proceedings in the domestic legal 
system, for this automatically undermined any allegations that domestic remedies were 
ineffective, even in Article 3 cases. 
                                                          
Ybk at 194. 
43 (1975) 4 DR 4. 
44 Ibid, 77-85. 
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 Allegations concerning the ill-treatment of detainees were also dealt with during the 
inter-State case of Ireland v UK referred to above. In particular the Irish government alleged 
that detainees were being hooded, spread-eagled for long periods against walls, deprived 
of food, water and sleep, and exposed to continuous loud or monotonous noises during their 
custody. The UK government, obviously disturbed by these applications, announced that 
the use of the impugned interrogation techniques had been stopped; at the same time the 
Prime Minister stated that ‘interrogation in depth’ would continue.45 In its report on the 
merits of the applications, issued in 1976,46 the Commission unanimously found that the 
techniques employed during the detaining and interrogating of suspects amounted to 
‘torture.’47 This was less than two months after the Commission’s decision in Donnelly v 
UK, where it had rejected the allegation that there was an administrative practice to mistreat 
detainees and that there were no effective domestic remedies available to address 
complaints of mistreatment. When the Court, in its first occasion to pronounce on an inter -
State matter, reviewed the Commission’s decision in 1978,48 it was asked not to consider 
individual cases but whether the United Kingdom was engaging in a State practice in breach 
of Article 3. All of the 14 individuals involved had already received compensation of 
between £10,000 and £25,000 from UK authorities for the treatment they had endured. By 
13 votes to four the Court held that these five techniques did not amount to torture. Instead, 
by 16 votes to one, it held that they were inhuman and degrading treatment, on the ground 
that the drafters clearly intended to reserve the label of torture for actions which were 
particularly cruel and caused intense suffering. The one judge who thought that the use of 
the five techniques did not even amount to degrading treatment was Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, 
the UK judge, and amongst the four judges who agreed with the European Commission that 
what had happened in Northern Ireland was torture was the Irish judge, Philip 
O’Donoghue.49 On the issue of whether the UK government had properly co-operated with 
the Commission’s investigations of the alleged incidents, the European Court ‘regretted’ 
                                                          
45 Statement of 2 March 1972 (see, Ireland v UK (1979-80) 2 EHRR 25, para 153). The world was to learn 
in 2011, in the report of the Baha Mousa Inquiry, that in fact the use of these techniques had not been 
abandoned by the British army. Some of them were still being employed by UK forces in Iraq in 2003: 
www.bahamousainquiry.org, Vol 2, Parts IV to IX.  
46 Published in 1976-78 ECHR, Ser B, vol 23-1, 377-90; extracts appeared in (1976) 19 Ybk 512. 
47 See, M O’Boyle, ‘Torture and Emergency Powers under the European Convention on Human Rights: 
Ireland v United Kingdom’ (1977) 71 Am J Int’l L 674. 
48 (1979-80) 2 EHRR 25. 
49 He was the Irish member of the European Commission from 1965 to 171 and was the Irish judge on the 
Court from 1971 to 1980. When appointed to the Commission he was 69, so when he retired from the 
Court he was 84. He had been called to the Bar before the partition of Ireland, in 1919, and was made State 
Counsel in 1939. 
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the Government’s attitude.50 Just recently it has come to light that even within the British 
government the five techniques were described as torture,51 so those of the so-called 
‘hooded men’ who are still alive are now seeking to have the case re-opened within 
Northern Ireland so that a further investigation can take place into whether the government 
deliberately misled the Strasbourg authorities.52 The Irish government has also asked the 
European Court to revise its 1978 judgment in the light of the revelations about the British 
government’s apparent duplicity.53   
Boyle observes that ‘[t]he real significance of the findings in Ireland v UK was the 
emphasis placed by the Commission and Court on the inadequacy of remedies during the 
period it was examining’.54 It may be speculated that if such interrogation methods were to 
be practised today, the Court might have reached a different conclusion, probably with the 
same rationale that underpinned its decision. Certainly, over the decades the Court’s 
attitude has somewhat shifted in this area, which is not surprising given its preference for 
interpreting the Convention as a ‘living instrument’, to be developed in light of changing 
circumstances.55 Such a change in the Court’s attitude regarding torture was made clear in 
Selmouni v France56 where the Court, finding the French State responsible for violating 
Article 3 of the Convention, noted that: 
 
certain acts which were classified in the past as ‘inhuman and degrading treatment’ as opposed 
to ‘torture’ could be classified differently in future…[T]he increasingly high standard being 
required in the area of the protection of human rights and fundamental liberties 
                                                          
50 In the words of Brian Simpson: ‘The British declined to identify either the locations where they had 
been. used or the senior individual who authorized their use. The British did not produce Brigadier Kitson, 
the military officer in command in Belfast at the time, as a witness. Witnesses who were produced were 
instructed to answer no questions about the practice of interrogation. Plainly, there was something deeply 
embarrassing to conceal, though the squalid details of what was done were already public knowledge. One 
can only speculate as to what else had to be concealed.’ (‘Round up the usual suspects: the legacy of 
British colonialism and the European Convention on Human Rights’ (1995-96) 41 Loy L Rev 629, 707.) 
Simpson concludes this long article by saying that ‘the United Kingdom’s record of failure under the 
European Convention, with the high point reached in Ireland v United Kingdom, can only be regarded as 
lamentable’ (708). 
51 See www.thejournal.ie/rte-documentary-torture-1498698-Jun2014/, last accessed 4 April 2016. 
52 Leave to bring judicial review proceedings was granted on 4 June 2015: see www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
northern-ireland-33008186, last accessed 4 April 2016. 
53 See www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/02/ireland-european-court-hooded-men, last accessed 4 April 
2016. 
54 ‘Human rights and political resolution in Northern Ireland’ (1982 -83) 9 Yale J World Pub Ord 156, 166-
7. 
55 Tyrer v UK (1978-80) 2 EHRR 1, para 31. 
56 (2000) 29 EHRR 403. 
13 
 
correspondingly and inevitably requires greater firmness in assessing breaches of the 
fundamental values of democratic societies.57 
 
Given that the European Court is never totally free from the political context within which 
it is operating, it is understandable that the Court exercised extreme caution while dealing 
with a highly sensitive, politically charged case where, as Ní Aoláin pointed out, ‘a leading 
Western democracy [was] being accused of [using] systematic torture in the context of a 
fraught internal conflict in Northern Ireland to which the British government had committed 
its military forces’.58 As will be seen in the context of the Turkish cases, while the Court 
did take some daring decisions holding the State responsible for torture, in the majority of 
cases the high threshold set to distinguish torture from inhuman and degrading treatment 
has rigorously been applied to absolve the State from the stigma of torture.  
 
The right to life 
Allegations that the British security forces had breached the right to life of protestors 
and terrorist suspects were also raised by the Irish government in the inter-State case, but 
were held to be inadmissible for lack of evidence. Other cases raising the same right had 
either also been declared inadmissible (because, for example, there was evidence that the 
victim was rioting at the time,59 or that the security forces had acted in self-defence60) or 
had been settled.61 Complaints about the killing of 14 people by British soldiers in Derry 
on 30 January 1972 (‘Bloody Sunday’) were dismissed for being out of time, having not 
been lodged until 1994.62 But a breakthrough occurred when the European Court held in 
McCann v UK, by 10 votes to nine, that when undercover British soldiers shot dead three 
members of the IRA in Gibraltar in 1988, believing that they were about to detonate a car 
bomb, Article 2 had been violated, because the operation to arrest the bombers had not been 
carefully enough planned.63 This case reaffirmed the principle that the use of lethal force 
must be strictly necessary for, and proportionate to, the achievement of the law enforcement 
                                                          
57 Ibid, para 101. 
58 Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and its Prohition on Torture,’ in Sanford 
Levinson, Torture: A Collection (Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2004) 213, 216. 
59 Stewart v UK (1985) 7 EHRR CD453. 
60 Kelly v UK (1993) 74 DR 139.  
61 Farrell v UK (1983) 5 EHRR 465. See, too, Caraher v UK (2000) 29 EHRR CD119, where the European 
Court rejected an argument that the UK was operating an administrative practice of ‘buying off’ the 
families of victims shot by security forces by offering them compensation. 
62 McDaid v UK (1996) 22 EHRR CD197. 
63 For an account of how this duty to plan carefully has been subsequently developed by the European Court see 
Dickson, (Strasbourg, 2016). 
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objective.64 The decision emphasized States’ positive obligations to take effective security 
measures before resorting to the use of lethal force and to conduct effective official 
investigation into suspicious deaths. This meant that States were not merely to refrain from 
taking life unless absolutely necessary for one of the purposes set out in Article 2(2), but 
that when death transpires they must take positive measures to investigate the 
circumstances and provide appropriate remedies in case of any fault attributable to the 
security forces. These principles have since been applied in numerous other cases, 
including applications taken against Turkey, where the absence of effective official 
inquiries into arbitrary deprivation of the right to life (or of property) were often found to 
constitute breaches of the Convention.65  
In a series of decisions issued in cases from Northern Ireland on 4 May 2001,66 the 
European Court developed a set of procedural obligations which have to be met by States 
when investigating deaths. As a result, amongst the current requirements of an Artic le 2 
compliant investigation are that it be independent of those alleged to have caused the loss 
of life, that it be initiated by the State rather than by the victim’s family or friends, that it 
be prompt and thorough, that it be capable of identifying whether excessive force was used 
and who might have been responsible for using it, and that it keep the next-of-kin of the 
deceased informed about the progress of the investigation. The system for holding inquests 
in Northern Ireland was found to be in breach of additional requirements in that persons 
who caused the death were not required to give evidence at the inquest, the deceased’s next-
of-kin could not get legal aid to attend, and the coroner and jury could not produce findings 
which would play an effective role in securing anyone’s prosecution.  
There have been several subsequent decisions by the European Court on 
applications brought from Northern Ireland in which the Court has held that the 
requirements for a proper investigation have not been met.67 In fact the UK government is 
still under scrutiny by the Committee of Ministers for not having fully implemented the 
judgments issued in May 2001. As discussed below, the authorities in Turkey have also 
been required to meet the exacting investigatory standards laid down by Strasbourg bodies, 
which demand the identification and potential punishment of those responsible for human 
                                                          
64 McCann v UK (1996) 21 EHRR 97, para 149. 
65 See, e.g., Akdivar v Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 143. 
66 Jordan v UK (2003) 37 EHRR 2; Kelly v UK App No 30054/96; McKerr v UK (2002) 34 EHRR 20; 
Shanaghan v UK App No 37715/97. 
67 See, McShane v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 23; Finucane v UK (2003) 37 EHRR 29; Brecknell v UK (2008) 46 
EHIRR 42; Hemsworth v UK, App No 58559/09, judgment of 16 July 2013. 
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rights abuses and the provision of compensation for the damages sustained by victims.68 
However, unlike in the Turkish cases, no relative of a deceased person in Northern Ireland 
has ever been found to have had his or her Article 3 rights breached while waiting for the 
proper investigation of a killing, though they have received damages for breach of their 
Article 2 rights in that context.69 Likewise, the European Court has never ruled that State 
security forces in Northern Ireland violated the negative duty not to take life in Northern 
Ireland. 
 
The right to a fair trial   
The United Kingdom set up special juryless courts in Northern Ireland (‘Diplock 
courts’) to try people accused of ‘scheduled offences’, but these were never condemned 
by the Strasbourg Court as being in breach of Article 6 of the Convention. In some ways 
they may have operated more fairly than jury trials, since the judges in question were 
obliged to give written treasons for their conclusions and persons convicted had an 
automatic right of appeal to a three-judge Court of Appeal. Likewise, attempts to limit the 
right of accused persons to remain silent during police questioning were very largely held 
to be consistent with that provision in Murray (John) v UK.70 Later, though, the lack of 
access to a solicitor, when coupled with the limits on the right to remain silent, was found 
to be a violation,71 and in another case the conditions in which a detainee was held were 
found to tip the scale in favour of there being a breach.72 These conditions had been 
experienced by hundreds of former detainees but had never previously been condemned in 
such terms by either a domestic or an international court. 
In the absence of any imaginative use of Article 14 in the Northern Ireland context, it 
was Article 6 which eventually came to the aid of people who were unable to challenge 
alleged discrimination at their workplace on the basis of their religious belief or political 
opinion. In Tinnelly & Son Ltd and McElduff v UK73 the Court found that this was a denial 
of access to justice. This decision was announced three months after the Belfast (Good 
                                                          
68 See, e.g., Menteş  v Turkey (1998) 26 EHRR 595; Selcuk and Asker v Turkey (1998) 26 EHRR 477. 
69 E.g. Hemsworth v UK, n 67 above, where the Court awarded the wife and father of a deceased man €20,000 in 
compensation under Art 2. Damages have also been awarded for investigative delay in domestic courts: see, 
e.g., Re Jordan’s Applications [2015] NICA 66, where £7,500 was a warded in compensation for delays caused 
by the Police Service of Northern Ireland during the inquest into a killing.  
70 (1996) 22 EHRR 29.  
71 Averill v UK (2000) 31 EHRR 839. 
72 Magee v UK, ibid. 
73 (1999) 27 EHRR 249. See too Devenney v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 643 and Devlin v UK (2002) 34 EHRR 
1029, where £10,000 was awarded for loss of opportunity in each case. 
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Friday) Agreement in 1998 and the UK authorities found that thereafter they could easily 
dispense with the previous practice whereby a government Minister was able to issue a 
certificate preventing someone from receiving a fair hearing of his or her complaint of 
discrimination. A comparable volte-face occurred in 2000 when the head of the police in 
Northern Ireland announced that solicitors were henceforth to be allowed to sit with 
detainees when they were being interviewed by the police. The head of the police and the 
government had previously argued that there was no legislative authority for such a 
practice, yet in the end it was able to be adopted without any new law or regulation having 
to be passed.74       
 
The Conflict in Turkey    
The armed conflict between the Kurdish insurgents (PKK) and the Turkish military 
has claimed more than 45,000 lives and injured countless more since 1984. Following 
Turkey’s recognition of the right of individual petition in 1987, an unprecedented series of 
conflict-related applications have been received by the Strasbourg organs,75 which seized 
an exceptional opportunity to craft novel principles concerning counterinsurgency 
practices. The resulting decisions and judgments not only brought to light the grave 
breaches of human rights, but also compelled Turkey to revisit some of its security policies. 
It is generally recognized that Turkey’s poor human rights record in general, and 
the unresolved Kurdish question in particular have been among the main reasons why 
Turkey’s candidacy to join the EU has faltered. It was first lodged in 1987 but the candidacy 
was not officially recognized by the European Council until the summit held in Helsinki in 
1999. While candidate status for EU membership has acted as a spur for Turkey to 
undertake some major human rights reforms, and even to enter into, presently mired, peace 
talks with the PKK, the ‘Kurdish question’ is still far from being resolved. Since first 
coming to power in 2002 (it won its fifth consecutive electoral victory in November 2015) 
the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has certainly altered the economic and 
political landscape of Turkey (particularly during its first two terms of office up to 2011) 
and thus somewhat improved the country’s long-lamented human rights record. 
                                                          
74 For further details see Dickson, n 8 above, 182-4. 
75 By the end of 2015, the ECtHR had delivered 3,182 judgments concerning Turkey, of which 2,812 found at 
least one violation of the Convention. This places Turkey at the apex of the ECtHR’s condemnation profile, the 
next worst state being Italy, with 2,336 judgments of which 1,781 found at least one violation.. See ‘Violations 
by Article and by State, 1959-2015’, available on the website of the ECtHR  at 
www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_violation_1959_2015_ENG.pdf, last accessed 22 April 2016.  
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Nonetheless, human rights issues connected with the Kurdish question remain centre-stage 
amid the uncertainty over frustrated attempts at bringing about a durable peace settlement.  
 The following section will focus on Strasbourg’s approach to the anti-terrorism 
measures adopted by the Turkish state in response to the PKK insurgency. As with Northern 
Ireland critical issues will be explored, such as the exhaustion and effectiveness of domestic 
remedies, the declaration of states of emergency and resort to derogations, and the 
allegations of discrimination and systematic administrative malpractices, with a view to 
shedding a brighter light on the actual and potential impact of the European Convention on 
conflicted societies. 
 
The right to individual petition  
The troubled situation in southeast Turkey led the authorities to introduce a long 
lasting emergency regime (from 1987 to 2002), which instigated serious restrictions on 
basic freedoms, including of assembly, association, speech and movement. According to a 
1997 Turkish Parliamentary Report, over 500 hundred conflict-related applications were 
lodged at Strasbourg about such incidents as village destructions, forceful disappearances, 
extrajudicial killings and torture.76  
The chief reason for the Kurdish applicants to invoke the Strasbourg machinery was 
the general disinclination of the Turkish regional courts to exercise effective jurisdiction. 
Kurdish applicants, who were aided by prominent Irish and British lawyers such as Kevin 
Boyle (who was experienced in handling conflict-related cases from Northern Ireland) and 
Françoise Hampson, engaged in strategic litigation at Strasbourg to try to bring about 
concrete changes in domestic law and practice as well as increase awareness of the ‘Kurdish 
reality.’77 The applications proved largely successful in drawing attention not only to the 
controversial anti-terrorism measures in Turkey but to the general weakness of the domestic 
remedies in providing some form of redress. The precedent-setting case of Akdivar,78 which 
calls to mind the position adopted by the ECmHR in the Northern Irish case of Donnelly in 
1973,79 introduced an exception to the rule of exhaustion of local remedies. In assessing 
                                                          
76 Report of the Turkish Parliamentary Scrutiny Committee Established for Studying and Determining 
Necessary Measures for the Problems of Citizens Who Emigrated Because of Village Evacuations in the East 
and Southeast, (10/25), 1997, No 532, p 1.   
77 See, Dilek Kurban et al, ‘Supranational Rights Litigation, Implementation and the Domestic Impact of 
Strasbourg Court Jurisprudence: A Case Study of Turkey’, Project Report Funded by the European 
Commission, 2008, pp 4-10.   
78 Akdivar, n 65 above. 
79 See the text at n 36 et seq above. 
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whether domestic remedies had to be exhausted at all times, the Court held that account had to 
be taken not only of the formal remedies at hand, but of the particular circumstances of each 
case. The Court concluded that there was no requirement to exhaust domestic remedies if those 
remedies were inadequate. It added, however, that ‘its ruling [was] confined to the particular 
circumstances of the present case.’80 In other words, the relaxation of the exhaustion rule did 
mean that there was an automatic entitlement to circumvent local remedies. The Court 
maintained its traditional approach in other cases, where it stressed that its position on non-
exhaustion of local remedies was not to be interpreted as a general statement that remedies 
were ineffective in southeast Turkey or that future applicants were absolved from the obligation 
to have initial recourse to domestic courts.81 
During the admissibility hearings the Turkish government displayed considerable 
suspicion towards the applicants who were complaining about counter-insurgency 
measures.82 The government also accused petitioners of manipulating the Convention system 
in order to undermine Turkey’s national security and legitimate the activities of the PKK.83 It 
further maintained that the failure of applicants to exhaust local remedies was an abuse of the 
right of individual petition and part of a strategy aimed at denigrating Turkey.84 In response 
to such claims, the ECtHR stated that the respondent State’s arguments could be accepted 
only if it were clear that the applications were based on untrue facts, which here had not been 
demonstrated.85  
Another issue faced by the applicants concerned the right to petition under Article 25 
of the ECHR without any hindrance from the State (now Article 34). Some applicants 
complained that they were subjected to pressure from the authorities to modify or withdraw 
their applications. In Akdivar, where the applicants were questioned by domestic authorities 
about their petitions, the Court found a violation of Article 25.86 In Kurt,87 the Court held that 
the government’s pressure on the applicant to withdraw her application was illicit, and that 
the threat of criminal measures against her lawyer was unacceptable.88 In Orhan,89 where the 
                                                          
80 N 65 above, paras 70 and 77.  
81 Aksoy v Turkey (1996) 23 EHRR 553, para 53; Menteş n 56 above, para 61.  
82 Salih Orhan v Turkey (1997) Commission Admissibility Decision, App No 25656/94. 
83 Akdivar, Cicek, Aktas and Karabulut v Turkey (1994) Commission Admissiblity Decision, App No 
21893/93; also see, Cagirca v Turkey (1994) Commission Admissiblity Decision, App No 21895/93. 
84 Akdivar, n 65 above, paras 51-55. 
85 Mizgin Ovat v Turkey, (1995) Commission Admissiblity Decision, App No 23180/94; Akdivar, n 65 above, 
para 54. 
86 Akdivar, n 65 above, paras 105-106.  
87 Kurt v Turkey (1998) ECHR 44. 
88 Ibid, paras 153-165 
89 Orhan v Turkey App No 25656/02, judgment of 18 June 2002.   
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applicant was summoned before the prosecutor on account of his application, the ECtHR 
similarly found this direct contact with the applicant to be inappropriate. In analogous cases, 
the Court consistently stated that Member States had to avoid dissuading or discouraging 
applicants or their representatives from pursuing a Convention remedy.90  
 
First instance fact-finding 
In view of persistent strong disagreements between applicants and the Turkish 
government over the depiction of alleged events stemming from the emergency region, the 
Convention organs deemed it necessary to hold fact-finding hearings in order to adjudicate 
on important factual inconsistencies. These hearings proved particularly vital not only in 
cases where there were marked discrepancies between the claims, but also where local 
authorities seemed to have avoided disclosing key evidence. Although fact-finding was meant 
to be exceptional, it became such a common practice that Turkish cases91 constitute 66 per 
cent of all the fact-finding missions conducted in the history of the Convention system.92 In 
the inter-State case relating to Northern Ireland very extensive fact-finding hearings took 
place as well: the seriousness of the conflict meant that some of these could not take place in 
Northern Ireland itself, or even in London, and so they were held in Norway.93   
In the cases examined by the Convention organs the authorities’ most frequently 
occurring failures relate to the lack of on-site investigations, the scarcity of witness testimony 
referring to critical issues, exclusive reliance on official statements on those issues, denial of 
fair trial guarantees, deficiencies or distortions in custody records and a lack of effective local 
remedies.94 While fact-finding exercises revealed that certain violations had been repeatedly 
committed,95 the Court chose to treat each case on its individual merits.96 Nonetheless, fact-
finding hearings97 were generally successful in undercutting official denials of any wrongdoing 
                                                          
90 See Tanrikulu v Turkey (2000) 30 EHRR 950, paras 126-133; Aksoy, n 81 above, paras 101-106.   
91 See, e.g., Aksoy, n 81 above; Aktas v Turkey (2003) 38 EHRR 18; Aydin v Turkey (1997) 25 EHRR 251. 
92 See, Philip Leach et al, International Human Rights & Fact Finding: An Analysis of the Fact-Finding 
Missions Conducted by the European Commission and Court of Human Rights, Report by the Human Rights 
and Social Justice Research Institute at London Metropolitan University, 2009, p 26. 
93 The European Commission delegated a group of its members to hear the testimony of no fewer than 119 
witnesses put forward by the Irish and UK governments; this took a period of 30 days. In addition there were 11 
days of oral submissions made to the Commission by the two governments.  
94 See Kaya v Turkey (1999) 28 EHRR 1, at pp 324-6 of Report; Ergi v Turkey (2001) 32 EHRR 18, at pp 1778-
1779 of Report; Cakiçi v Turkey (2001) 31 EHRR 5; Aydin n 91 above; Tanrikulu n 90 above. See also Basak 
Cali, ‘The Logics of Supranational Human Rights Litigation, Official Acknowledgement, and Human Rights 
Reform: The Southeast Turkey Cases before the European Court of Human Rights, 1996-2006’ (2010) 35 Law 
& Social Inquiry 325. 
95 Ipek v Turkey (2004) ECHR 74, para 137. 
96 Orhan, n 89 above, paras 393-394. 
97 Strasbourg organs came to refrain from fact-finding hearings after the end of 1990s, when the conflict lost its 
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in the emergency region, which in turn undermined the official claim that applicants had acted 
with the main motive of discrediting the State.   
 
Allegations of systematic violations  
As in Northern Ireland, Turkish cases in Strasbourg emerged against a backdrop 
of an entrenched political crisis which engendered acts of terrorism, but also 
unconventional counter-terrorism measures that violated human rights on a large scale. 
Allegations of an ‘administrative practice’ featured regularly in the individual applications 
during the 1990s,98 where it was essentially argued that the violations suffered amounted to a 
systematic practice due to their unremitting and discriminatory character and that it was 
therefore necessary to examine not only individual incidents complained of but also the 
overall context and pattern within which such infractions transpired.99 As noted above, the 
lawyers in Kurdish cases were seeking to effectuate politico-legal change in Turkey and to 
challenge the denial of the Kurdish problem. Francoise Hampson, one of the chief 
representatives of the Kurdish applicants, reportedly said that their strategy proved effective 
in creating ‘a significant number of court judgments [with the effect that] Turkey could no 
longer pretend in the Council of Europe that there was not a human rights problem.’100 She 
regretted, however, that although findings of gross violations were important tools of the 
strategy to ‘change things,’ they were ‘less successful’ in convincing the Court ‘to recognize 
the scale of the problem’.101 Indeed, while fact-finding hearings revealed a pattern of certain 
transgressions (such as house-burnings, disappearances, extrajudicial killings and a lack of 
remedies), the resulting findings were treated as isolated incidents—an approach which gives 
credence to the idea that the Convention system is not suited to dealing with gross or 
systemic violations.102  
                                                          
intensity and Turkey’s ambition to join the EU had instigated legal reforms. The new Court’s struggle to deal 
with the increasing backlog of cases and the expensive nature of the fact-finding missions had also contributed 
to this development. See Leach, n 92 above, p 41ff.  
98 Before the recognition of the right of individual petition, the inter-State mechanism was invoked a few 
times to address the issue of systematic violations. See Cyprus v Turkey, App No 8007/77, 13 D&R 85 
(1979); Cyprus v Turkey (1982) EHRR 482; France, Norway,Denmark, Sweden and The Netherlands v Turkey, 
App Nos 9940-44/82, 35 DR 143 and 44 DR 31 (1983).   
99 See Aisling Reidy et al, ‘Gross Violations of Human Rights: Invoking the European Convention on 
Human Rights in the Case of Turkey’ (1997) 15 NQHR 161, 165. 
100 Interview with Françoise Hampson, Ankara, 9 March 2008, cited in Kurban et al, n 77 above, p 5. 
101 Ibid. 
102 See Menno T. Kamminga, ‘Is the Euopean Convention on Human Rights Sufficeintly Equipped to Cope with 
Gross and Systematic Violations,’ (1994) 12 NQHR 153. 
21 
 
 The following cases attest to the gravity of the allegations concerning the existence of 
an administrative practice in Turkey. In Aksoy, the applicant complained that he was tortured 
during his 14-day incommunicado detention in the emergency region where national authorities 
tolerated widespread violations of human rights and failed to provide effective remedies.103 
Although the Court found domestic remedies illusory and inadequate, thereby absolving the 
applicant from the rule of exhaustion, ‘it did not find it necessary’ to determine whether there 
indeed existed an official practice of systematically tolerating human rights abuses.104  
Likewise, the applicants in Akdivar complained that they were victims of an 
administrative policy which condoned the destruction of some three thousand villages and 
the displacement of almost two million people. They further stressed that since massive 
population displacement was a State-inspired strategy, it was impossible to make recourse 
to effective remedies.105 Whilst the Court found exceptional circumstances which absolved 
the applicants from their duty to exhaust local remedies, it did not consider the evidence 
strong enough to justify a finding of an administrative practice.106  
Analogously, in a string of judgments concerning the claim that the applicants had 
been subjected to gross violations on account of their Kurdish origin, the Strasbourg organs 
found allegations of ethnic discrimination to be unsubstantiated; this mirrors what occurred 
in relation to cases from Northern Ireland, where applicants were repeatedly told that they 
had not adduced enough evidence to substantiate their claims that they had been 
discriminated against on grounds of religion, political opinion, national origin or 
association with a national minority. Likewise, in Kurt,107 where the applicant asserted that 
forced disappearances mainly targeted people of Kurdish origin, the Court deemed the 
evidence insufficient to reach such a conclusion. Similarly, in both Akdivar and Hasan 
Ilhanli,108 the Court refused to draw an inference of a discriminatory policy of mass house 
demolitions targeting the Kurdish community.109  
Put in a nutshell, submissions that violations were part and parcel of an administrative 
or discriminatory practice were dismissed by the Strasbourg bodies either on the basis of 
insufficient evidence or on the unsatisfactory ground that it was ‘not necessary to determine 
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whether the failings identified [were] part of a practice adopted by the authorities.’110 As with 
cases from Northern Ireland, the Convention organs steadfastly adopted a case-by-case, fact-
specific approach to all counter-terrorism related issues. While a finding that there had been a 
systematic administrative or discriminatory practice would have placed much heavier pressure 
on Turkish authorities to conduct its anti-terror measures in line with Convention requirements, 
Strasbourg’s choice of handling each case as an isolated incident was arguably critical for 
ensuring that Turkey did not become wholly alienated from the Council of Europe. This quasi-
political stance might also have motivated the ECtHR when dealing with some of the human 
rights issues arising in Northern Ireland, in particular the alleged abuses resulting from 
derogation notices, discrimination on grounds of religious belief or political opinion, 
internment without trial and ill-treatment of detainees. s 
  
Village destructions  
One of the most distinguishing features of the Turkish conflict has been the village 
destruction phenomenon. In its combat against the PKK insurgency, the Turkish security forces 
evacuated and destroyed over three thousand rural settlements. The practice of village 
destruction during the 1990s forced over three million inhabitants to leave their homes.111 
Kurds who were suspected of providing shelter to the PKK, or who refused to be recruited into 
the State-sponsored paramilitary ‘village guard system’, were at times made an example of by 
having their villages burnt down - a strategy which was aimed at depriving the PKK of access 
to food, shelter and potential recruits.112 The motive behind the village destructions has never 
been the subject of Strasbourg scrutiny; the rulings eschewed the difficult question of whether 
destructions had been a form of punishment for the applicants’ alleged involvement in the 
PKK.113  
Instead the European Court has focused on whether, in individual cases, Articles 3 and 
8 of the ECHR have been violated. In assessing whether home destructions resulting in massive 
uprooting of populations attained the minimum level of severity for the purposes of Article 3, 
the Court adopted a contextual approach by taking into account the physical and mental effects 
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of the treatment. In Dulas,114 the fact that the applicant was over 70 when her home and 
property were destroyed before her eyes, leaving her destitute and without shelter and obliging 
her to leave her accustomed community, and the fact that there was no official remedy to 
alleviate her plight, were all considered in reaching the conclusion that the complained acts 
amounted to inhuman treatment.115 Again, in Yoyler,116 the destruction of the applicant’s home 
was not only found to constitute a grave and unjustified interference with the applicant’s rights 
to privacy and property, but also with his right to freedom from inhuman or degrading 
treatment. The finding of inhuman treatment was similarly justified on grounds that the 
victim’s house was burned before the eyes of his family members, rendering them vulnerable 
without any support and obliging them to seek a livelihood elsewhere.117 In a series of cases 
brought on behalf of the displaced, the Strasbourg bodies generally found the authorities 
responsible for destroying homes and possessions.118 The Court acted on the premise that since 
home and privacy are inextricably connected, the destruction of the villages constituted grave 
and unjustified interferences with the applicants’ rights to privacy and family lives as well as 
the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions.119  
Although the Court recognised the extent of the village destruction problem and the 
lack of accountability for the perpetrators, it has never contextualised the events within a 
broader framework. Apart from requiring the payment of compensation to the victims, this 
approach did not provide a compelling incentive to the government to identify and punish those 
responsible for the atrocities. Significantly, however, in a judgment delivered in 2013,120 the 
Court did require Turkey (under the supervision of the Committee of Ministers) to identify and 
punish the perpetrators of an indiscriminate bombing of two villages in 1994, which caused 38 
deaths and numerous injuries. These belated steps are of crucial importance for public 
acknowledgement of past wrongs and for eradicating impunity for serious human rights 
violations.  
  
Enforced disappearances and the right to life 
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Following his official visit to Turkey in November 2012, Christof Heyns, the UN 
Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, observed that one of 
the most urgent challenges facing Turkey was to eradicate the culture of impunity for those 
responsible for unresolved killings and deaths in custody, in particular during the 1990s. The 
Rapporteur expressed his regrets that only a negligible number of trials had been conducted, as 
there had been a lack of political will to hold perpetrators of gross violations accountable before 
the statute of limitations expired.121  
In cases of alleged disappearances and extrajudicial killings, the Court considered 
allegations of Article 2 violations in both their substantive and procedural aspects. Regarding 
substantive claims, the Court generally applied a high standard of proof by requiring allegations 
that disappearances and killings had been committed by the security forces to be proved beyond 
reasonable doubt. In this class of case, the Court did not initially give much weight to the wider 
context, nor did it give due acknowledgement to the extreme difficulty facing the applicants in 
obtaining hard evidence from non-cooperative authorities. When applicants had no conclusive 
evidence but relied on mere inferences or unproven hypotheses, the Court did not consider 
reversing the burden of proof - even when the government was condemned for a lack of 
effective investigations.122 It should be noted, however, that when the Court deemed the 
evidence inadequate for it to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that the disappeared person 
had been killed by State agents, it then turned to the question whether there had been an 
effective investigation of the incident. When the Court held that the national authorities failed 
to carry out adequate investigations into the circumstances surrounding the matter, it generally 
found a procedural violation of Article 2.123 There are similarities here with the cases coming 
to Strasbourg from Northern Ireland: the United Kingdom government has never been 
condemned by the ECmHR or ECtHR for breaching its negative obligation not to deprive 
people of their lives, but it has been condemned for not properly investigating controversial 
killings in which it may in some way have been implicated.  
Kurt v Turkey,124 decided in 1998, was the first involuntary disappearance case. The 
applicant submitted that her son might have died in unacknowledged police custody, within a 
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political context characterised by high incidents of torture, unexplained deaths and forced 
disappearances. Having applied its high standard of proof, the Court found no substantial 
breach of Article 2 on grounds that the allegations were merely presumptions resting on 
purportedly tolerated practices of disappearances and extra-judicial killings of detainees.125 
Concerning the claim that the failure to conduct an effective investigation into the 
disappearance constituted a separate violation of Article 2, the Court surprisingly examined the 
claim under Article 5, ruling that the victim was subjected to unacknowledged detention in the 
complete absence of the safeguards contained in Article 5.126 
The case of Cakici127 occasioned for the first time a finding of a substantial breach of 
Article 2. The applicant complained that his brother disappeared in 1993 after being subjected 
to unacknowledged detention by the security forces. In 1996, only after the transmission of 
government submissions to the Commission, the applicant learned that his brother had been 
killed by the security forces in an alleged clash with PKK militants in 1995. The government 
asserted that the victim was identified by his identity card found on his person. Deviating from 
its approach in Kurt, the Court not merely examined the disappearance claim under Article 2 
but attached significant weight to ‘circumstantial evidence based on concrete elements’ in 
reaching the conclusion that the applicant must have died after his unacknowledged 
detention.128 While the facts of Cakici were not markedly distinct from those of Kurt, the Court 
in the instant case had no hesitation in drawing ‘very strong inferences’ from the authorities’ 
claim that the victim’s identity card was found on the body of a dead terrorist.129  
In another leading case, Timurtas v Turkey,130 where the victim lost his life during his 
six-and-a-half year unacknowledged detention, the Court found a violation of Article 2 on both 
substantial and procedural grounds.131 Once again, in a bid to distinguish its approach from 
Kurt, the Court employed rather unconvincing reasoning by stating that in the present case the 
passage of time since the detention was six-and-a-half years (two years longer than in Kurt), 
that it had been established that the victim was taken to a place of detention (in Kurt the victim 
was seen to be surrounded by the soldiers), and that there was no doubt that the victim was 
wanted by the authorities about his alleged involvement with the PKK (in Kurt the victim was 
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merely under suspicion of having links with that organisation).132 Despite the relative 
insignificance of these differences,133 the positive shift in the ECtHR’s position clearly 
indicated that it tacitly acknowledged the wider socio-political context of the 1990s within 
which unacknowledged detentions and enforced disappearances had posed serious threats to 
human life.  
 
The right not to be ill-treated  
Apart from the findings of ill-treatment in village destruction cases, Strasbourg 
bodies have also identified incidents of torture committed by the security agents. In the 
Turkish cases the Court continued to require a higher level of egregiousness of ill -treatment 
as a central parameter of torture, which is singled out as carrying a special stigma. Aksoy134 
was the first individual case to result in a finding of torture. In this case, the applicant 
complained that he was forced to strip naked and was then suspended for long periods by 
the arms tied behind his back - a form of ill-treatment known as ‘Palestinian hanging.’ The 
Court concluded that such treatment, considering its serious and cruel nature, could only 
be described as torture.135 It is worth noting that Aksoy also occasioned a significant shift 
in the distribution of the burden of proof in some allegations of torture: if individuals are 
taken into custody in good health but are found on release to be injured, national authorities 
must offer a plausible explanation for the injury.136  
Since acts of torture are often committed with the intention of obtaining information, 
inflicting punishment or intimidating a suspect, the Court in Dikme137 made reference to the 
concept of ‘purpose’ as an element of torture. Having referred to the definition of torture in the 
1987 UN Convention against Torture, the Court determined that the infliction of ill-treatment 
‘was intentionally meted out to the … applicant by agents of the State in the performance of 
their duties, with the aim of extracting a confession or information about the offences of which 
[the detainee] was suspected’.138 However, the Court did not further clarify whether the 
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purposive element constituted an ‘essential ingredient’ of torture. Again in Akkoc,139 where the 
victim was subjected to various forms of ill-treatment including sexual abuse, electric shocks, 
cold water treatment and threats to her children, the Court found that the severity of the 
purposeful infliction of ill-treatment had met the higher threshold of torture.140 Notwithstanding 
such unelaborated references to the notion of purpose, it appears that the ‘severity’ test still 
remains the ultimate yardstick whereby the Court distinguishes torture from ill-treatment.  
Although most findings of torture concerned an accumulation of cruel and inhuman 
acts, in the ground-breaking case of Aydin v Turkey141 the Court unprecedentedly recognised 
that an act of rape, in and of itself, could amount to torture. In Aydin, the applicant was 
repeatedly beaten, forced to remain naked, and then raped by an unidentified agent in police 
custody.142 The Court held that ‘the accumulation of acts of physical and mental violence 
inflicted on the applicant and the especially cruel act of rape to which she was subjected 
amounted to torture’.143 Significantly, the findings of Aydin inspired a landmark judgement in 
Akayesu144 where the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda found responsibility for 
genocide and war crimes based on acts of rape. 
When the lack of adequate and effective local remedies for torture victims became the 
subject of complaints, the ECtHR emphasised the fact that terrorism did not give authorities 
carte blanche to hold suspects in detention free from judicial review and to deny unlawfully 
detained individuals the right to seek effective remedies.145 Likewise, the Court found breaches 
of the right to an effective remedy on account of the failure of national authorities to carry out 
prompt and effective investigations into alleged violations capable of leading to the 
identification and punishment of those responsible and to the compensation of the victim where 
necessary.146 These judgments, despite their non-assertive character, sought to break the cycle 
of impunity for perpetrators of gross violations. In this connection, when the perpetrators of 
torture in Bati147 could not be prosecuted before the statutory limitation period had expired, the 
Court vehemently noted that, due to the lack of sufficient promptness and reasonable diligence 
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on the part of national authorities, ‘the main perpetrators of acts of violence have enjoyed 
virtual impunity, despite the existence of incontrovertible evidence against them’.148 
 
The impact of Strasbourg case law on Turkish law and practice  
As in the case of Northern Ireland, it is possible to draw links between some of the 
conclusions reached by the ECtHR in applications lodged against Turkey and subsequent 
specific reforms to Turkish domestic law and practice. Starting in 1999, when Turkey was 
first officially recognized as an EU candidate, and until recent times, Turkey has adopted 
various crucial measures to improve its tarnished human rights record and thereby qualify 
for full EU accession negotiations. The reforms were introduced in order to meet the so-
called Copenhagen criteria, but several actually derived from Court judgments issued in 
Strasbourg.149 The reforms included critical amendments to the Constitution such as the 
elimination of military judges from the State Security Courts (SSCs),150 the erosion of 
military dominance at the National Security Council151 and the granting of supremacy to 
international human rights treaties over national law,152 the last being a development which 
secured the direct application of Strasbourg judgments within Turkey’s domestic legal 
system. A further effort to reduce the number of applications lodged at the ECtHR came 
with the amendment to Article 148 of the Constitution, which enabled individuals to submit 
complaints to the Turkish Constitutional Court before having to resort to the ECtHR.153  
In response to an ECtHR pilot judgment,154 Turkey also set up a Compensation 
Commission with a view to providing satisfactory redress for those who suffered from 
excessive delays in judicial proceedings. This remedy enabled the ECtHR to redirect more 
than 2,500 pending applications back to national courts.155 The Compensation Commission 
complemented an earlier remedial action which sought to ensure adequate reparations for 
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victims of human rights abuses committed in pursuit of anti-terrorism.156 Amelioration of 
the procedural safeguards at police custody is worth mentioning too. Deferring to the Salduz 
judgment,157 Turkey adopted a series of measures to remove barriers which inhibited early 
access to legal assistance for those on remand and other untried detainees.158  
Further democratic reforms encompassed the abolition of the death penalty159 the 
introduction of a zero tolerance policy on torture160 (which reduced significantly the 
number of reported cases of torture and ill-treatment), as well as the lifting of the decades-old 
state of emergency regime161 and restrictions on Kurdish broadcasting. Although 
restrictions remained on the use of the Kurdish language in public education,162 these 
progressive cultural initiatives, culminating in the formation of a State-run Kurdish TV 
channel, marked a dramatic departure from the assimilationist policies of the past.163  
Regrettably, since the second half of 2015 the pace of reforms has come to a standstill. 
Even before the recommencement of hostilities, change in practice was generally slow and 
faltering, for the administrative and juridical structures often resisted reforms, in large measure 
due to their statist reflexes which urged them to maintain the political status quo.164 The high 
number of cases against Turkey at Strasbourg also demonstrates that there is not yet an 
adequate incorporation of European jurisprudence into the country’s practices.165 Turkey 
continues to rank among the countries that have the highest number of non-implemented 
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ECtHR judgments because of structural problems that hinder the effective protection and 
promotion of human rights.166  
As the EU’s 2015 Report underlined, the recent re-escalation of the conflict between 
the military and PKK insurgents has led to tangible backsliding in some key areas, including 
freedom of expression, judicial independence and, perhaps most importantly, the process for 
settling the Kurdish issue.167 Another 2015 Council of Europe Report stressed that Turkey 
should make progress in such matters as re-opening unfair criminal proceedings, reducing the 
length of detention on remand and preventing excessive actions of the security forces.168 What 
is more, securing the criminal liability of public officials for grave breaches remains 
problematic. Despite numerous Strasbourg rulings requiring Turkey to conduct effective 
investigations into alleged violations, with a view to the potential prosecution of suspected 
offenders, Turkey has yet to eradicate the culture of impunity for violations committed within 
the context of counter-terrorism. Among the major obstacles to accountability are the need to 
obtain administrative authorisation to initiate proceedings against the security personnel and 
the 20-year statute of limitations for the prosecution of those responsible for egregious 
breaches.169 The result is that many unresolved offences from the 1990s now risk being timed 
out, forgotten and unaccounted for. 
 
Conclusion 
 After such a brief analysis of the Convention jurisprudence arising out of the 
conflicts in Northern Ireland and Turkey it would be unwise to try to identify specific 
juridical patterns established by the Convention organs or to draw all-encompassing lessons 
as to how the jurisprudence could be employed to balance security concerns and human 
rights issues in other conflict zones. It nevertheless appears plausible to offer the following 
two broad observations on the Northern Irish and Turkish experiences.  
First, significant difficulties remain with the breadth of the margin of appreciation 
afforded to States regarding their right to declare a public emergency and to derogate from 
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the ECHR. Granting States such a wide discretion has left the ECtHR in a rather weak 
position when exercising its supervisory functions at times of conflict. It is certainly the 
case that in relation to both of the conflicts examined here the Court has struggled to 
pinpoint and condemn various systematic practices amounting to gross violations of human 
rights. Difficulties associated with fact-finding, with the standard and burden of proof, and 
with external political factors have combined to neuter the effectiveness of the Court in 
putting a break on unacceptable large-scale abuses. It might have been possible for these 
abuses to have been considered in more detail through strategically lodged inter-State 
applications, but these have been few and far between. As regards applications from 
individuals, some of the Convention’s stringent admissibility criteria have hindered a 
number of potentially meritorious applications from being considered by the Strasbourg 
organs during times of internal conflict, and in situations where admissibility hurdles have 
been overcome further obstacles have been placed in the applicants’ path in terms of 
deference to state discretion and lack of commitment to a truly ‘dynamic and evolutive’ 
and ‘practical and effective’ approach. In short, in this context the ECHR has not been 
treated as a ‘living instrument’ to the degree that it might have been.170 
Second, it is principally in conflict-related cases that the Court has, to its credit, 
developed the doctrine of substantive positive obligations arising out of Articles 2 and 3 of 
the ECHR. By finding violations of these positive obligations, sometimes described as 
procedural rather than substantive, the Court has managed to send a message to the States 
concerned that their discretion is not as broad when they are asked by litigants to get to the 
bottom of what practices were carried out with or without the State’s blessing. On the other 
hand, Articles 13 and 14 of the Convention, guaranteeing the rights to an effective remedy 
and to be free from discrimination, have been relatively under-utilised by the Court when 
processing complaints in the context of internal conflicts. This is disappointing, since it 
represents a neglected opportunity to make a helpful contribution to the settlement of 
conflicts centred around contested ethno-political, racial, linguistic and religious 
differences. This might be an area where, through reports and interventions,  the Council of 
Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights could play a more prominent role in helping the 
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Court to address in a more meaningful way the range of allegations of systematic and gross 
violations which are often at play within conflicted societies.  
